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Quantum Conference Key Agreement (CKA) is a cryptographic effort of mul-
tiple parties to establish a shared secret key. While bipartite quantum key
distribution protocols are also useful in the context of CKA, multipartite pro-
tocols allow for a more efficient generation of the necessary correlations and
are therefore viewed favorably in the context of quantum networks. In future
quantum networks, generating secret keys in an anonymous way is of tremen-
dous importance for parties that do not only want to keep their shared key
secret but also protect their own identity, e.g. in the context of whistle-blowing.
In this paper we provide the first protocol for Anonymous Quantum Con-
ference Key Agreement and demonstrate it using four-photon Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states.
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1 Introduction
One of the main applications of quantum information processing is to provide additional se-
curity for communication. The most common setting is one of two parties, Alice and Bob,
who want to establish a shared secret key in order to encrypt further communication. Since
their initial proposal (1), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have been proposed and
implemented in a standard fashion, even though several practical challenges still remain to be
addressed (2).
In this work, we examine a more generalised scenario, where several parties want to estab-
lish a secret key. We introduce a new notion of anonymity in this generalised multiparty setting,
where we request that the identities of the parties sharing the secret key, are also protected in
the best possible way. There are several reasons why such scenarios are highly relevant. One
such scenario is the case of whistle-blowing; a person might want to broadcast an encrypted
message such that specific parties can decrypt it, while keeping the identities of all involved
parties secret. For anonymous whistle-blowing, the underlying protocol needs to involve non-
participating parties, such that an authority maintaining the network cannot figure out who
takes part in the secret communication. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time that
anonymity is examined in such a setting, protecting the identity of the sender and of multiple
receivers at the same time.
To succeed in attaining our goal, we need to address two different elements, anonymity and
multiparty key generation, often referred to as conference key agreement or CKA (for a concise
review, we refer the interested reader to (3)). Combining the two, we achieve anonymous par-
allel message transmission, which allows a sender (who we will refer to as Alice) to transmit
a private message to specific receivers of her choosing (who we will refer to as Bobs), while
keeping their identities secret, both from external parties, and from each other.
Previous work (4) has shown how to achieve anonymous transmission of classical bits using
the correlations natural to the GHZ state and also how to anonymously create bipartite entan-
glement from a larger GHZ state. In (5) the latter is developed further, by adding a scheme
for anonymous notification of the receiver and a verification scheme (6, 7) to the (anonymous)
entanglement generation. Because it is not possible to distill multiple bipartite (e.g. Bell-)
states from a single GHZ state, this approach is not sufficient here and we need an alternative
approach to be able to perform anonymous CKA over a subset of the entire network. One pos-
sibility would be to use other multipartite entangled quantum states (8–10) to create bipartite
entanglement between the sender and all receivers separately. Here, however, we focus on us-
ing the GHZn state shared through the entire network to anonymously establish the necessary
entanglement between sender and receivers by using a single quantum state.
In this paper, we introduce a protocol to establish a secret key between Alice as a sender and
m receiving parties of her choosing. We use both ‘Bob’ and ‘receiver’ to refer to each of those
receiving parties and ‘participants’ to refer to Alice and all the Bobs of her choice. The m Bobs
are notified anonymously by Alice through a notification protocol. The m+ 1 ≤ n participants
are part of a larger network of n parties. We will start by sharing a large GHZ state between n
parties, which can be done either centrally, or using a given network infrastructure via quantum
repeaters or quantum network coding (11). From the GHZn state, we subsequently show how
to anonymously extract an (m+ 1)-partite GHZ state shared between Alice and her selection
of m Bobs. Repeating the sharing and distillation, the resulting states can either be verified or
used to run the CKA protocol.
2
2 Constructing the Anonymous Key Agreement protocol
We first consider the case where all participants, including the source of entanglement, are hon-
est and trusted. We propose and analyse a protocol for establishing a common secret bit between
Alice and m Bobs, while keeping the identities of the m+1 participants secret, even from each
other. To achieve our goal, we make use of two sub-protocols, which we call Notification
and Anonymous Multiparty Entanglement. We now first introduce them separately.
Our version of Notification is based on (12) and is a classical protocol used by Alice
to notify the m receiving agents, while maintaining anonymity for all parties involved. The
protocol requires pairwise private classical communication (which can be established using a
key generation protocol based on a Bell pair) and access to private sources of randomness. An
illustration of Protocol 1 can be found in Fig. 1.
Protocol 1 Notification
Input. Alice’s choice of m receivers.
Goal. The m receivers get notified.
Requirement. Private pairwise classical communication channels and sources of randomness.
For agent i = 1, . . . , n:
1. All agents j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do the following.
(a) When j corresponds to Alice (ja), and i is not a receiver, she chooses n random bits
{rij,k}nk=1 such that
⊕n
k=1 r
i
j,k = 0. If i is a receiver, she chooses n random bits such
that
⊕n
k=1 r
i
j,k = 1. She sends bit r
i
j,k to agent k (Fig. 1a).
(b) When j 6= ja, the agent chooses n random bits {rij,k}nk=1 such that
⊕n
k=1 r
i
j,k = 0
and sends bit rij,k to agent k (Fig. 1b).
2. All agents k ∈ {1, . . . , n} receive {rij,k}nj=1 (Fig. 1c), compute zik =
⊕n
j=1 r
i
j,k and send
it to agent i.
3. Agent i takes the received {zik}nk=1 (Fig. 1d) to compute zi =
⊕n
k=1 z
i
k; if z
i = 1 they are
thereby notified to be a designated receiver.
Analysis: Anonymity is maintained following the work of (12). Remember that by the na-
ture of our goal, the identities of the Bobs are available to Alice since she has chosen them.
The Notification protocol requires O(n3) communication channel uses between pairs of
parties. Note that the Notification protocol is in fact allowing Alice to anonymously com-
municate a bit to a receiver, and therefore it could in theory be used to share the same bit with
all Bobs and thereby establish a common key. Such a process would however be extremely
inefficient in the quantum resources, since for each bit of the secret keyO(n3) Bell pairs would
need to be consumed. We could therefore use Notification to expand the preshared ran-
domness that QKD protocols require, but as shown in (11), this is less efficient than sharing
multipartite entanglement. If instead, we use Notification only once to notify the receivers
anonymously, we can exploit the properties of shared multipartite entangled states to establish
a common key more efficiently while maintaining the anonymity that Protocol 1 provides.
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(a) Step 1a of Notification with ja = 1.
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(d) Step 3 of Notification with i = ib.
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Figure 1: Visualisation of Protocol 1. The table contains all rij,k for a fixed agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in the
Notification protocol. Here, we identify Alice with P1. She chooses {ri1,k}nk=1 and sends them to Pk in
Step 1a (Fig. 1a). Note that only if i is a receiver, the green row adds up to 1 (mod 2); otherwise to 0 (mod 2).
Analogously, the pink highlighting shows Step 1b from the perspective of Pj′ (Fig. 1b). This and all other rows
add up to 0 (mod 2). The {rij,j′}nj=1 that Pj′ receives in Step 2 (Fig. 1c) are highlighted in purple. The last row,
highlighted in blue, shows the {zik}nk=1 received by Pi in Step 3 (Fig. 1d). By construction, only if i = ib is a
receiver, it adds up to 1 (mod 2).
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We now introduce Anonymous Multiparty Entanglement, the second subprotocol.
As a generalisation of the protocol first proposed in (4) for anonymously distributing Bell states,
it is a protocol for anonymously establishing GHZ states. Here, n parties are sharing a GHZ
state, and m + 1 of them (Alice and m receivers) want to anonymously end up with a smaller,
(m+ 1)-partite GHZ state. To achieve this, all parties require access to a broadcast channel – a
necessary requirement to achieve any type of anonymity for the participants in a communication
setting (13). Protocol 2 is visualised in Fig. 2.
Protocol 2 Anonymous Multiparty Entanglement
Input. A shared GHZ state 1√
2
(|0〉n + |1〉n); the (m+ 1) identities of Alice and the Bobs.
Goal. An (m+ 1)-partite GHZ state shared between Alice and the m Bobs.
Requirement. A broadcast channel; private sources of randomness.
1. Alice and the Bobs each draw a random bit. Everyone else measures in the X-basis,
yielding a measurement outcome bit xi.
2. All parties broadcast their bits in a random order or, if possible, simultaneously.
3. Alice applies a Z gate if the parity of the non-participating parties’ bits is odd.
B1
B2 Bm−1
Bm
A
. . .
B1
B2 Bm−1
Bm
A
. . .
B1
B2 Bm−1
Bm
A
. . .
(1) (2)
Figure 2: Visualisation of Protocol 2. A GHZn state is shared with all agents left of arrow (1). Here, the
participants are highlighted in green and blue. Since the shared GHZn state is agnostic of the receivers’ identities
and all agents are entangled right of arrow (1), they are all highlighted in pink. Right of arrow (2), all non-
participating parties are disentangled and therefore not highlighted anymore. The m Bobs and Alice now share a
GHZm+1 state after completing the steps of Anonymous Multiparty Entanglement (2).
Analysis: The correctness of the protocol follows from the proof in (4). With the Hadamard
matrix H we can rewrite the GHZn state as
1√
2n−m
∑
x∈{0,1}n−m−1
( |0〉m+1p + (−1)|x| |1〉m+1p )⊗H⊗(n−m−1) |x〉p ,
where |x| is the Hamming weight of x and the subscripts p and p indicate the participating and
non-participating parties, respectively. Remember that H interchanges the X- and Z-bases.
After the X-measurements of Step 1, the state shared between Alice and the Bobs is therefore
1√
2
( |0〉m+1 + (−1)|x| |1〉m+1 ), where x contains all measurement outcomes announced in Step
2. Finally, in Step 3, Alice can locally correct the state to obtain the desired (m + 1)-partite
GHZ state based on |x|.
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With respect to anonymity, the key elements are the intrinsic correlations of the GHZ states.
As observed in (4), any rotation around the zˆ-axis applied to any of the qubits of a GHZ state
has the same effect on the global state independent of the choice of the qubit. To see this,
observe that a rotation Rz(θ) := (σz)
θ
pi on any of the n qubits of the GHZ state 1√
2
(|0〉n +
|1〉n) results in the state 1√
2
(|0〉n + eiθ |1〉n), therefore not revealing the choice of the qubit. To
perform the correction, Alice only needs (the parity of) the measurement outcomes of the non-
participating parties, but, to mask their identity, the Bobs announce a (random) bit as well. It is
straightforward to see that no one can infer any information about the operations performed by
the different parties, since their announced bits are uniformly random, and the application of a
Z-gate does not reveal the position of the qubit it was applied to to the other parties. Only Alice
knows the identities of the Bobs, so only she is able to discern the ‘true’ outcomes from the
random bits. Therefore, the protocol does not leak any information about the identity of either
Alice or the Bobs.
We can now join the above protocols, in order to achieve Anonymous Key Agreement
between Alice and the m Bobs of her choosing.
Protocol 3 Anonymous Key Agreement
Input. Alice’s choice of m Bobs; L GHZn states.
Goal. A common secret key of length L anonymously shared between Alice and the m Bobs.
Requirement. Private pairwise classical communication channels and sources of randomness; a
broadcast channel.
1. Alice anonymously notifies m chosen Bobs by running the Notification protocol.
2. All n parties run Anonymous Multiparty Entanglement using the L states.
3. Alice and the Bobs Z-measure their qubits and obtain a common secret key of length L.
The above protocol provides two different notions of anonymity, both for the Sender and the
Receiver. We define these below.
Definition 1 (Sender Anonymity) A protocol allows Alice to remain anonymous sending a
message to m Bobs, if an adversary who corrupts t ≤ n− 2 players, cannot guess the identity
of Alice with probability higher than 1
n−t .
Definition 2 (Receiver Anonymity) A protocol allows Bob to remain anonymous receiving a
message from Alice, if an adversary who corrupts t ≤ n− 2 players, cannot guess the identity
of Bob with probability higher than 1
n−t .
It follows directly from the properties of the two subprotocols, that Protocol 3 provides both
Sender and Receiver Anonymity (12), excluding the trivial cases where Alice is corrupted (in
which case she already knows the Bobs’ identities). Note that this also protects the identities
of each Bob and of Alice, even from the other notified participants of the protocol. Note that
so far we have considered only honest-but-curious agents; in the next section we will relax this
constraint to consider untrusted settings.
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3 Anonymous Key Agreement in untrusted settings
We will now examine the case were some agents are not honest-but-curious anymore, but are
actively trying to extract information from the protocol.
3.1 Dishonest Source
The ostensibly obvious strategy to account for a source that does not share the correct entangled
state is to verify the GHZn state shared by the source directly after sharing (6,7). This approach
works for a dishonest source and honest-but-curious agents, since once the state is shared there
is no further communication between the parties apart from using the broadcast channel. There-
fore, any appropriate verification protocol run after the distillation of the GHZm+1 state (after
Step 2 of Protocol 3, Anonymous Key Agreement), suffices to detect malicious behavior
of the source. Our Verification protocol is similar to (6), and inspired by the pseudotelepa-
thy studies of (14), but simplified for the case of honest-but-curious participants and Alice as a
fixed verifier.
Protocol 4 Verification
Input. A verifier V ; a shared state between k parties.
Goal. Verification or rejection of the shared state as a GHZk state by V .
Requirements. Private sources of randomness; a classical broadcasting channel.
1. Everyone but V draws a random bit bi and measures in the X- or Y -basis if their bit
equals 0 or 1 respectively, obtaining a measurement outcome mi.
2. Everyone broadcasts (bi,mi), including V , who chooses both at random.
3. V resets her bit such that
∑
i bi = 0 (mod 2). She measures in the X- or Y -basis if her
bit equals 0 or 1 respectively, thereby also resetting her mi = mv.
4. V accepts the state if and only if
∑
imi =
1
2
∑
i bi (mod 2).
Analysis: From (6), we know that if the state ρ shared between the parties is far from the
GHZ state with respect to the trace distance
d(ρ, |GHZ〉〈GHZ|) := 1
2
|tr(ρ− |GHZ〉〈GHZ|)| ,
then V will reject the state with high probability. Denoting by T(ρ) = 1 the event that the
Verification protocol accepts a state with density matrix ρ, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1 (cf. (6)) If d(ρ, |GHZ〉〈GHZ|) = , then Pr[T(ρ) = 1] ≤ 1− 2
2
.
3.2 Dishonest agents
In the more general case where the agents can also be malicious however, any verification
technique used on the large GHZ state (like protocol 4, also used in (5)) creates a critical
security problem. An agent not belonging to the set of designated receivers, might not measure
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in Step 1 of Protocol 2, and thereby, when it is used during Protocol 3, end up sharing a GHZ
state with the legitimate participants. This security risk was independently noticed in (15) for
the case of two-party communication.
It is now evident that in the setting of dishonest agents the Verification protocol has
to be performed after distilling the GHZm+1 state, whereas for the setting of (only) a dishonest
source this was not necessary but only preferred. We are thus required to ‘postpone’ the veri-
fication step till after Step 2 of Protocol 3, to make sure that only Alice and the chosen Bobs
share the final GHZ state. Our proposed process keeps their identities secret, while they apply a
verification protocol similar to the one presented above for verifying a GHZ state. We are now
ready to define Protocol 5 for anonymously sharing a key between Alice and m Bobs, where L
is the number of shared GHZ-states and D is a parameter both determining the level of security
and the length of the generated shared key. The main difference between the proposed protocol
and the one in (5), is that the non-participating parties are asked to announce random values,
and that the protocol aborts if the values are not announced in time.
Protocol 5 Anonymous Verifiable Key Agreement
Input. Alice as the verifier; parameters L and D.
Goal. Anonymous generation of secret key between Alice and m Bobs.
Requirements. A source of GHZn states; private sources of randomness; a random source that
is not associated with any party; a classical broadcasting channel; pairwise private classical
communication channels.
1. Alice notifies the m Bobs by running the Notification protocol.
2. The source generates and shares L GHZ states.
3. The parties run the Anonymous Multiparty Entanglement protocol on them.
4. The parties ask a source of randomness to broadcast a bit b such that Pr[b = 1] = 1
D
.
Verification round: If b = 0, Alice runs the Verification protocol on the
(m+1)-partite state, therefore only considering the announcements of the m Bobs.
The remaining parties announce random values.
KeyGen round: If b = 1, Alice and the Bobs measure in the Z-basis .
5. If Alice is content with the checks of the Verification protocol, she can anony-
mously validate the protocol.
Analysis: The above protocol aims to establish a secret key between Alice andm Bobs, while
keeping their identities secret, both from outsiders and each other. The correlations between the
inputs and the outputs of Alice and the Bobs, can only be observed by Alice, since they look
random to anyone but Alice. In addition, when Alice is verifying the shared GHZ state between
her and the m Bobs of her choice, she can indirectly verify that the Notification protocol
has run correctly, since otherwise some of them would not be able to provide the appropriate
input/output correlations when running the Verification protocol. As the latter protocol
verifies that the state shared between Alice and them Bobs is close to the GHZ state, and by de-
fault they are all honest, Theorem 1 holds. If Alice accepts the checks of the Verification
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protocol, anonymity is also maintained since the state is close to the GHZ state (except with
some small probability).
On average D− 1 states will be used to verify the state and only one to provide a secret key.
Therefore the key rate of Protocol 5 approaches L
D
in the asymptotic regime.
4 Experimental Implementation
To test the Anonymous Verifiable Key Agreement protocol experimentally we de-
monstrate the Verification and KeyGen rounds experimentally. For simplicity we omit
running Step 1 of the protocol, since this can be done by standard implementations of BB84
links. We request our source to prepare L GHZ4 states on which we run the Verification
protocol using a random seed. Our demonstration uses a four-photon GHZ state in polarisation
encoding (H = 0, V = 1) generated using two parametric down-conversion sources (16). The
setup is displayed in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: A laser pumps two SPDCs after which both emit a photon pair. The state of each photon pair can
be described as |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|H,V 〉 − |V,H〉) (H = 0, V = 1). Subsequently, two photons, one photon from
each pair, interfere in a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), after which post-selecting only four-photon events the state
|GHZ′〉 = 1√
2
(|H,V, V,H〉 − |V,H,H, V 〉) is obtained; this state is locally equivalent to the GHZ4 state. The
state fidelity is calculated to be F = 0.81.
Without loss of generality we can assume that a fixed party always plays the role of Alice who
wants to obtain a common key with her choice of Bobs. We will consider all three configura-
tions of her choosing two Bobs to establish this common key while preserving the anonymity
of all participants. Tab. 1 shows the different measurement operators used in the different con-
figurations.
Fig. 4 shows the probabilities of a successful Keygen round pk and Verification
round pv for all three different network configurations. From this, we can calculate the overall
probabilities averaged over all network configurations to be pˆk = 92.974 ± 0.4230 and pˆv =
87.178± 0.2028.
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Configuration AB1B2P4 AP2B1B2 AB1P3B2
Verification (0, 0, 0) XXXX XXXX XXXX
Verification (0, 1, 1) XY Y X XXY Y XYXY
Verification (1, 0, 1) Y XY X YXXY Y XXY
Verification (1, 1, 0) Y Y XX YXYX Y Y XX
KeyGen ZZZX ZXZZ ZZXZ
Table 1: The last row describes the KeyGen rounds; rows two to five describe all possible Verification
rounds (b1, b2, b3) depending on the randomly drawn bits bi. Alice resetting her bit in Step 3 of Protocol 4
corresponds to having an even number of Y -measurements in every Verification round.
AB1B2P4 AP2B1B2 AB1P3B2
84%
86%
88%
90%
92%
94%
96%
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
pk
pv
pk
pv
pk
pv
Figure 4: Probabilities of a successful KeyGen round pk (left) and Verification round pv (right), for all
three network configurations listed in Tab. 1. The probabilities are calculated as the number of correct measure-
ments divided by the total number of measurements; each pv is the average of the four different measurement
operators for that specific configuration.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this work, we demonstrated how to establish a common key between several parties, while
keeping their identities secret. Studies of anonymous entanglement have been conducted based
on various quantum states, that share a different type of entanglement than the GHZ state; for
instance in (17) anonymous transmissions using W states is studied. However, we specifically
focus on GHZ states since they show straightforward correlations that can be used to achieve
key agreement. If we want to correct for errors and maximise the secret key rate, we need to per-
form Error Correction and Privacy Amplification schemes (11,18) while preserving anonymity.
This can be quite intricate and should therefore be carried out carefully. We leave this as an
open question to be addressed in subsequent work.
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